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Advance Directives and the Promotion of Autonomy: a comparative Australian 
statutory analysis 
 
Lindy Willmott* 
  
1. Introduction  
 
Legislation governing advance directives has been enacted in six out of eight 
Australian jurisdictions.1  The main reason for enacting legislation was uncertainty 
about whether an advance directive made by a competent adult, particularly a 
directive refusing life-sustaining medical treatment, formed part of Australian 
common law.  The enactment of legislation enshrining common law principles 
regarding advance directives should also have enshrined principles of autonomy as 
these principles underpin the common law regime.  As examined in this article, 
however, the extent to which Australian legislation promotes autonomy in this 
important area is questionable. 
 
The common law overseas has been settled for many years.  A competent adult is 
entitled to make a directive refusing life-sustaining medical treatment and, provided 
the directive was valid and applicable to the medical situation that later arose, had to 
be followed by medical professionals.2  In reaching this position, the courts have 
engaged with two important but conflicting principles: autonomy and the sanctity of 
life.  The principle of autonomy (commonly referred to as a ‘right of self-
determination’) dictates that a competent adult has a right to refuse life-sustaining 
treatment.  On the other hand, the state has an interest in protecting and preserving the 
lives of its citizens, this interest stemming from the principle of sanctity of life.  In the 
context of refusing life-sustaining treatment, the cases have consistently held that the 
                                                 
* Lindy Willmott, BCom, LLB (Hons) (UQ), LLM (Cantab); Professor, Health Law Research Program, 
Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology. 
1 Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA); Guardianship and Administration 
Act 1990 (WA) pt 9B; Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic); Medical Treatment (Health Directions) Act 
2006 (ACT); Natural Death Act 1989 (NT); Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) chap 3. 
2 See, for example, Re T (adult: refusal of treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649, 653; Airedale NHS Trust v 
Bland [1993] AC 789, 864; Re C [1994] 1 All ER 819, 824; Re AK (medical treatment: consent) [2001] 
FLR 129, 134; HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] 2 FLR 408, [20]; W Healthcare NHS Trust v H 
[2005] 1 WLR 834, 838.  In Canada, see Malette v Shulman (1990) 67 DLR (4th) 321.  In the United 
States, see, for example, Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital (1914) 211 NY 125, 129-130. 
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principle of autonomy prevails over that of sanctity of life,3 whether the individual’s 
refusal of treatment is made contemporaneously or in advance of the medical situation 
arising. 
 
Although the published academic literature predicted that advance directives would be 
binding in Australia,4 until recently, there was been no judicial authority on point.5  
The desire to clarify the law has been one of the driving factors behind the enactment 
of legislation throughout Australia.  In a number of speeches introducing Bills into 
State and Territory parliaments, reference has been made to the need to make the law 
certain, both for the benefit of individuals who wish to make an advance directive, 
and for medical professionals treating those individuals.6   
 
A goal of enacting legislation, in addition to clarifying the law, was to promote 
individual autonomy by facilitating a competent adult making a directive to refuse 
unwanted medical treatment.  Despite this goal, all of the statutes regulate the 
circumstances in which the advance directive will operate.  Such regulation, in one 
way or another, limits the circumstances in which an advance directive will be 
effective to ensure medical treatment is not given.  For example, regulation exists 
regarding form, when a directive can be completed, when it will operate, and when it 
can be disregarded.  While some of the restrictions may be justified because they are 
needed to ensure that a decision to refuse treatment represents the wish of a competent 
individual, many of the restrictions cannot be justified on this basis.  This article 
argues that many statutory provisions effectively erode a competent individual’s right 
                                                 
3 In the United Kingdom, see, for example, Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 
649, 661; Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 864; Re AK (medical treatment: consent) [2001] 
FLR 129, 134; HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] 2 FLR 408, [30]; W Healthcare NHS Trust v H 
[2005] 1 WLR 834, 838.  In Canada, see, for example, Malette v v Shulman (1990) 67 DLR (4th) 321, 
328.     
4 See, for example, Ian Kerridge, Michael Lowe and Cameron Stewart, Ethics and law for the health 
professions (3rd ed, 2009), 253; Cameron Stewart, ‘Advance Directives: Disputes and Dilemmas’ in Ian 
Freckelton and Kerry Petersen (ed), Disputes and Dilemmas in Health Law (2006) 38; Janine 
McIlwraith and Bill Madden, Health Care and the Law (4th ed, 2006) 132; John Devereux, Australian 
Medical Law (3rd ed, 2007) 905; Loane Skene, Law and Medical Practice (3rd ed, 2008) [5.8], 
Butterworths, Halsbury’s Laws of Australia, vol 18 (at 9 September 2009) 280 Medicine, ‘6 Consent’ 
[280-3025]. 
5 In July 2009, the New South Wales Supreme Court declared that a document completed by a 
competent adult constituted a valid advance directive to refuse kidney dialysis: Hunter and New 
England Area Health Service v A [2009] NSWSC 761. 
6 The parliamentary speeches are considered in section 2 below. 
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to refuse unwanted medical treatment, and should not form part of a legislative 
framework. 
 
This article examines the extent to which legislation promotes or erodes an 
individual’s autonomy by exploring three issues.  Firstly, the significance of the 
principle of autonomy both at common law and under the statutory regimes is 
examined.  Secondly, what it means to promote autonomy in the statutory context will 
be explored.  While it is widely accepted that the principle of autonomy should 
underpin both the common law and legislative regimes, there has been very little 
consideration about what ‘autonomy’ means in the context of statutory reform, and 
what statutory provisions are necessary for, or incompatible with, the attainment of 
autonomy.  Thirdly, after providing an overview of how the legislative schemes 
operate, the restrictions that exist in the legislation are examined.  As part of this 
analysis, the restrictions will be critiqued against the principle of autonomy.   
 
One final point needs to be made at the outset.  While advance directives, both at 
common law and under most of the statutory regimes, can relate to directives about 
treatment generally, this article is concerned only with advance directives that refuse 
life-sustaining medical treatment.  This kind of advance directive is the most 
controversial because of the significant consequences of compliance, namely the 
death of the individual.  It is also this kind of directive for which the principles of 
autonomy and sanctity of life are brought into sharp conflict, as is reflected in many 
of the common law decisions.   
 
2. Expressed significance of autonomy in common law and statutory 
regulation  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the principle of autonomy underpins legal 
regulation of a competent individual’s right to refuse medical treatment, even if that 
treatment is needed to sustain his or her life.  This is the case both for a 
contemporaneous refusal of treatment, and for an advance refusal of treatment that is 
contained in a written or oral advance directive.  There are many judicial 
pronouncements in the United Kingdom and elsewhere that establish and confirm the 
significance and relevance of autonomy in shaping the common law.  One of the 
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earliest and most famous statements is that of Lord Goff in Airedale NHS Trust v 
Bland: 
First, it is established that the principle of self-determination requires that respect must 
be given to the wishes of the patient, so that if an adult patient of sound mind refuses, 
however unreasonably, to consent to treatment or care by which  his life would or 
might be prolonged, the doctors responsible for his care must give effect to his wishes, 
even though they do not consider it to be in his best interests to do so …Moreover the 
same principle applies where the patient’s refusal to give his consent has been 
expressed at an earlier date, before he became unconscious or otherwise incapable of 
communicating it …7 
 
After much speculation, three Superior Courts in Australia have recently handed 
down decisions regarding the refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment.  In July 
2009, the New South Wales Supreme Court in Hunter and New England Area Health 
Service v A8 (‘Hunter’s case’) declared that a document completed by a competent 
adult constituted a valid advance directive to refuse kidney dialysis.  The effect of the 
declaration was that the hospital treating the adult was required to comply with the 
directive and withhold dialysis, even though such action was likely to result in the 
adult’s death.  Shortly afterwards, the Western Australian Supreme Court considered 
the contemporaneous refusal of life-sustaining treatment in the high-profile case of 
Brightwater Care Group v Rossiter9 (‘Rossiter’s case’).  One week after the Western 
Australian decision, the ACT Supreme Court in Australian Capital Territory v 
JT10(‘JT’s case’)  refused to declare that it was lawful to withhold artificial nutrition 
and hydration from a mentally incompetent patient who had requested that such 
sustenance cease.  In the first two cases, the Justices commented specifically about the 
importance of the principle of autonomy when a competent adult refuses medical 
treatment. 
 
 In Hunter’s case, when considering the issue of autonomy and the potential conflict 
with the principle of sanctity of life, McDougall J reviewed a number of United 
                                                 
7 [1993] AC 789, 864.  These comments have subsequently been referred to in other English decisions 
including Re AK (medical treatment: consent) [2001] FLR 129, 133-134, Re B (adult: refusal of 
medical treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449, 456; HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] 2 FLR 408, [30].  For 
other judicial statements acknowledging the supremacy of autonomy in decisions about medical 
treatment, see Re T (adult refusal of medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649, 661 and 665 and W 
Healthcare NHS Trust v H [2005] 1 WLR 834, 838.   
8 [2009] NSWSC 761. 
9 [2009] WASC 229. 
10 [2009] ACTSC 105. 
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Kingdom decisions, as well as a famous American and Canadian decision.11  After 
citing extensively from these decisions, his Honour ultimately agreed with the notion 
that the principle of autonomy should prevail in the context of a competent individual 
refusing treatment.  Interestingly, his Honour intimated (without deciding) that, in 
fact, conflict may not necessarily exist between the principles of autonomy and 
sanctity of life where a competent adult refuses treatment.  His Honour suggested that 
this is because the very right to refuse treatment is part of what we value as 
individuals, and that very right is encompassed by the term ‘sanctity of life’.  His 
Honour observed that ‘[r]ecognition of the right to reject medical treatment does not 
depreciate the value of life’.  Quoting from Robins JA in the famous Canadian case of 
Malette v Shulman,12 his Honour continued that ‘[i]ndividual free choice and self-
determination are themselves fundamental constituents of life.  To deny individuals 
freedom of choice with respect to their health care can only lessen, and not enhance, 
the value of life’.13  
 
When considering the tension that is said to exist between autonomy and the sanctity 
of life, his Honour concluded that: 
 
a proper understanding of society’s interest in the preservation of life cannot be 
considered without taking into account the constituents, or attributes, of life.  In a free 
and democratic society those attributes include the right of autonomy or self-
determination.14 
 
Rossiter’s case involved the contemporaneous request by a competent individual, a 
quadriplegic, for his medical treatment to cease.  Mr Rossiter was unable to take food 
or water orally, so received hydration and nutrition through a percutaneous 
endoscopic gastrostomy tube that had been inserted directly into his stomach.  Mr 
Rossiter wanted this treatment to stop, and both he and Bridgewater Care Group (who 
was responsible for caring for Mr Rossiter) sought declarations about their respective 
rights and obligations.  Martin CJ also considered the significant body of case law that 
                                                 
11 His Honour also cited from a decision of the South Australian Supreme Court in F v R (1983) 33 
SASR 189 where King CJ noted at 193 ‘the paramount consideration that a person is entitled to make 
his own decisions about his life’.  Although this statement was not made in the context of refusing 
medical treatment, it was endorsed by the High Court of Australia in Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 
CLR 479 at 487 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ. 
12 (1990) 67 DLR (4th) 321. 
13 Ibid 334. 
14 [2009] NSWSC 761, [16]. 
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exists in common law countries and concluded that Mr Rossiter, possessing the 
requisite capacity, was entitled to decide on the treatment that he wished to receive or 
refuse.  Further, such a decision had to be respected by the facility caring for him.  His 
Honour referred to the long recognised principle of autonomy and self-determination 
and observed that an aspect of this principle is the right not to consent to medical 
treatment, ‘even if the failure to treat will result in the loss of the patient’s life’.15  
Further, his Honour found that a ‘medical practitioner or a service provider who 
provides treatment contrary to the wishes of a mentally competent patient breaks the 
law by committing a trespass against the person of that patient’.16 
 
JT’s case involved a man who was chronically psychotic, suffering from paranoid 
schizophrenia characterised by religious obsessions.  JT had become obsessed with 
fasting in the belief that this would bring him closer to God.  The ACT brought an 
application for a declaration that it would be lawful not to provide JT with artificial 
nutrition and hydration except as it was needed for palliative care.  Although this 
declaration was refused on the basis that JT lacked capacity to make a decision about 
artificial feeding, Higgins CJ cited Hunter’s case with approval. While not using the 
language of autonomy, Higgins J noted that a competent adult was able to refuse 
nutrition even though it would result in his or her death.   
 
Autonomy is also the principle that has underpinned Australian legislation on advance 
directives.  Legislation has been enacted in six of Australia’s eight jurisdictions, with 
only New South Wales and Tasmania relying only on common law regulation.  When 
introducing the various Bills into their respective parliaments, it is clear that the 
intention of governments has been to promote autonomy by allowing individuals to 
complete directives refusing treatment that would bind medical professionals should 
capacity to make medical treatment decisions be lost at a later time. 
 
South Australia was the first Australian jurisdiction to enact legislation, the Natural 
Death Act 1983 (SA), which allowed a competent adult to complete a document that 
refused treatment in advance.  The original legislation has subsequently been repealed 
and replaced by the Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 
                                                 
15 [2009] WASC 229, [26]. 
16 [2009] WASC 229, [31]. 
 	 Page	7	
 
(SA).  In introducing the latter Bill into the Legislative Assembly, the Hon SJ Baker 
referred to patient autonomy as the ‘underlying tenet of the Bill’.17  He continued: 
The concept of dignity of the individual requires acceptance of the principle that 
patients can reject unwanted treatment.  In this respect, the wishes of the patient 
should be paramount and conclusive even where some would find their choice 
personally unacceptable.18 
 
It was also stated by the Hon SJ Baker that the legislation ‘confirms the common law 
right to refuse treatment’.19 
 
In 1988, the Northern Territory Government introduced the Natural Death Bill 1988, 
which was modelled largely on the earlier South Australian legislation.  In his first 
reading speech, the then Attorney-General, the Hon DW Manzie commented that the 
Bill ‘will provide a framework that will ensure that any person who so desires will 
have his or her wishes and rights respected in the circumstances that I have 
outlined’.20  The last words are a reference to the fact that advance directives could 
only be given if the individual was suffering from a terminal illness. 
 
The Victorian legislation was designed to give effect to some of the recommendations 
made by the Social Development Committee, a Committee established by the 
Victorian Government to inquire into a number of issues related to treatment of dying 
patients.21  The Committee heard from more than 150 witnesses and received almost 
1400 written submissions.  As a result of its investigations, it observed that many 
patients ‘felt frustrated in having what they regarded as clear refusals to undergo 
further medical treatment ignored or not acted upon by medical practitioners’.  It also 
observed the reluctance of medical professionals to discontinue treatment where there 
was any doubt about the patient’s competence or wishes.  It therefore recommended 
the enactment of legislation to contain the following features: 
                                                 
17 South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 3 November 1994, 989 (Stephen 
Baker).   
18 Ibid.  Similar comments were made when this Bill was introduced into the Legislative Council: 
South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 5 August 1993, 60 (Barbara Wiese). 
19 South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 3 November 1994, 990 (Stephen 
Baker). 
20 Northern Territory, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 17 August 1998, 3537 (Daryl 
Manzie).   
21 The Social Development Committee received a reference from the Governor in Council on 17 
December 1985.  The Second and Final Report of the Committee upon ‘Inquiring into Options for 
Dying with Dignity’ was delivered in April 1987.   
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 Clarification of the existing common law right to refuse medical treatment; 
and 
 Enactment of an offence of medical trespass, to be defined as occurring when 
a medical practitioner carries out or continues with any procedure or treatment 
where a competent patient freely and informedly refuses that procedure or 
treatment; and  
 Conferring protection from criminal or civil liability on the part of a medical 
practitioner who acts in good faith and in accordance with the express wishes 
of the fully informed, competent patient who refuses medical treatment.22 
 
As observed by the Hon EH Walker when the Bill was read in the Legislative Council 
for the second time, the Bill ‘gives effect to these recommendations’.23 
 
The ACT enacted the Medical Treatment (Health Directions) Act 2006 (ACT) 
relatively recently.  This Act replaced the Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT) which 
first facilitated a competent adult making a direction to refuse treatment.  A stated 
objective of both the (repealed) 1994 and 2006 statute is ‘to protect the right of 
patients to refuse unwanted medical treatment’.24  As the later Act effectively re-
enacted the provisions of the earlier Act relating to advance directives, the 
parliamentary speeches regarding the 2006 legislation were relatively brief.  There 
was a more detailed debate when the Bill was first introduced into the Legislative 
Assembly in 1994.  The then Attorney-General and Minister for Health, the Hon T 
Connolly, observed that the Medical Treatment Bill ‘essentially clarifies the legal 
situation in relation to withholding treatment’. 25 The Hon T Connolly referred to the 
‘very grey legal area’ where a doctor ceases medical intervention and allows a patient 
to die.26  Coupled with the desire to make the law certain was the Government’s 
intention that there be ‘a method by which an individual can make it clear that they do 
not wish to have intensive interventional treatment and that they wish nature to take 
its course’.27  While not using the language of autonomy, it was clear that it was the 
                                                 
22 These recommendations were also noted by the Legislative Council when introducing the Bill for the 
second time: Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 23 March 1988, 333 (Evan 
Walker), and by the Legislative Assembly when the Bill was read for the second time: Victoria, 
Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 5 May 1988, 2166 (Andrew McCutcheon).   
23 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 23 March 1988, 333 (Evan Walker).  Similar 
comments were made when this Bill was introduced into the Legislative Assembly: Victoria, 
Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 5 May 1988, 2166-2168 (Andrew McCutcheon).   
24 Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT) s 4(a) and Medical Treatment (Health Directions) Act 2006 
(ACT) s 5(a). 
25 ACT, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 14 September 1994, 2874 (Terry Connolly). 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
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intention of the Government to give an individual the right to refuse treatment, and to 
ensure that a medical professional who follows that directive by discontinuing 
treatment be protected. 
 
Queensland’s Powers of Attorney Bill was introduced into Parliament in 1997 and 
enacted in 1998.  One of the stated objectives of the Bill as set out in the Explanatory 
Notes is ‘to enable a person to give directions in relation to their future health care if 
they are unable to do so for themselves’.28  When introducing the Bill into Parliament, 
the then Attorney-General and Minister for Justice, the Hon DE Beanland observed 
that the legislation allowed an individual to do what he or she has always been 
entitled to do: 
 Just as a person has always been entitled to refuse medical treatment regardless of the 
consequences, this provision…will enable a person to exercise that right in the future 
through a direction which takes effect only on their becoming incapable of doing so.29 
 
Again, although the Attorney-General did not use the language of autonomy, he did 
refer to the ‘entitlement’ of a competent adult to refuse unwanted medical treatment.  
To this extent, it would appear that the underlying intention of the legislature was to 
enhance autonomy. 
 
Most recently, the Western Australian Parliament enacted the Acts Amendment 
(Consent to Medical Treatment) Act 2006.  The Bill was first introduced into the 
Legislative Assembly in June 2006 but did not receive Royal Assent until June 
2008.30  The Bill was first introduced into the Legislative Assembly by the Hon JA 
McGinty, the then Minister for Health.  In his second reading speech, the Hon JA 
McGinty emphasised the need to remove uncertainty in relation to the law and to 
provide a formal legislative framework to ensure that the wishes of individuals would 
be carried out.  In the course of his speech, he commented in the following terms: 
 
 The principle of personal autonomy is central to the bill.  The bill establishes a 
simple, flexible scheme whereby persons can ensure that, in the event that they 
become mentally incompetent and require medical treatment for any condition, 
                                                 
28 Explanatory Notes, Powers of Attorney Bill 1997 (Qld) 1. 
29 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 8 October 1987, 3687 (Denver 
Beanland). 
30 At the time of writing, the amending Act had not yet commenced operation. 
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including a terminal illness, their consent, or otherwise, to specified treatment can be 
made clear in an advance health directive …31 
 
The above review demonstrates the significance of the principle of autonomy in the 
context of a competent adult’s advance refusal of medical treatment.  The 
paramountcy of the principle has been reiterated in the strongest possible terms in the 
case law.  The principle also underpins legislative reform.  While there is variation 
across the States and Territories regarding the language used when introducing the 
Bills, there is uniform recognition that legislation is needed to ensure legal certainty in 
this area, to ensure that a competent adult can refuse treatment in advance of losing 
capacity, and to ensure that such refusal can be relied upon by medical professionals.  
Some Parliamentarians expressly refer to the term ‘autonomy’ while others note that 
competent adults should be able to refuse medical treatment.  Further, most 
parliamentary speeches recognise that the legislation simply enshrines rights that 
previously existed under the common law.  This recognition is significant because, as 
outlined earlier, these common law rights are underpinned by the principle of 
autonomy.  
 
3. Promoting autonomy in legal regulation  
 
The parliamentary debates and, in some cases, the legislation itself reveal the 
objective of statutory reform.  That objective is to clarify the law by legislatively 
enshrining the existing common law right of a competent adult to give an advance 
refusal of medical treatment that will bind medical professionals.  Such an outcome, 
as is articulated in those debates, would promote individual autonomy.   
 
The next step is to ask how autonomy, as referred to in the debates and some of the 
statutes, can best be achieved through legislative reform.  It is submitted that 
achieving this objective requires a consideration of two issues.  Firstly, the meaning 
of ‘autonomy’ in the context of giving an advance directive that refuses life-sustaining 
treatment must be clearly articulated.  Once the meaning of the term in this context is 
clear, then regulation can be framed to confer and protect the rights that flow from 
                                                 
31 Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 21 June 2006, 4061b (Jim 
McGinty).  Similar observations were made when the Bill was introduced into the Legislative Council: 
Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 6 December 2006, 9244b (Sue Ellery). 
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this principle.  This is not a difficult task, given the relatively expansive consideration 
given to the meaning of autonomy in the common law decisions.   
 
The second step is to consider whether there are any barriers that have hindered 
compliance with advance directives at common law.  If such barriers exist, it would 
be desirable for legislatures to consider whether those barriers could be addressed 
through statutory reform.  Removing practical barriers that existed at common law 
should lead to increased compliance with statutory advance directives.  As such, 
individual autonomy would be promoted.  These barriers are considered later in this 
section. 
 
Essence of autonomy at common law 
To ensure autonomy is achieved through legislatively enshrining common law 
principles, it is necessary to articulate the essence of autonomy at common law.  In 
other words, how does the common law promote autonomy in the context of an adult 
wishing to give an advance directive that refuses life-sustaining treatment?  This 
question is answered by examining the prerequisites that must be satisfied at common 
law for an advance directive refusing treatment to be binding on a medical 
professional.  Since the decision in Hunter’s case, the position in Australia, as well as 
in overseas jurisdictions, is clear.  For an advance directive to be binding and to 
operate in a given situation, the following three elements must be satisfied: 
 
 The adult must have been competent at the time the advance directive was 
completed.  For this requirement to be satisfied, the adult must have had 
capacity to make the directive, 32 and the ability to communicate that directive 
in some way.33 
                                                 
32 The meaning of ‘capacity’ is well understood at common law.  A person is regarded as lacking 
capacity if ‘[t]he person is unable to comprehend and retain the information which is material to the 
decision, especially as to the likely consequences of having or not having the treatment in question; [… 
and] the patient is unable to use the information and weigh it in the balance as part of the process of 
arriving at a decision’: Re C (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1994] 1 All ER 819, 824.  This test 
has been adopted in many subsequent English decisions including Re MB [1997] 2 FCR 541, 553-554, 
Re B (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449, 459, and by the New South Wales 
Supreme Court in Hunter’s case [2009] NSWSC 761, [25].   
33 R (on the application of Burke) v The General Medical Council [2004] EWHC 1879 (Admin) 440 
(although note that, in overturning the decision, the Court of Appeal suggested caution in relying on 
aspects of Munby J’s judgment in future cases: R (on the application of Burke) v The General Medical 
Council [2005] EWCA Civ 1003 [24]). Further, at common law, an individual is presumed to have 
capacity to make a decision about health care: Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649, 664; Airedale NHS Trust v 
Bland [1993] AC 789, 864, 892; Re C [1994] 1 All ER 819, 824; HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] 2 
FLR 408, 414–415; Hunter’s case [2009] NSWSC 761, [23]; Brightwater Care Group (Inc) v Rossiter 
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 The directive must have been given by the adult free of undue influence or any 
other vitiating factor.34 
 
 The adult must have intended the directive to have operated in the situation 
that has ultimately arisen.35 
 
In light of Hunter’s case, it is also clear that the following element need not be 
satisfied: 
 The adult must be provided with sufficient information to enable him or her to 
make an informed decision about whether to refuse treatment.36 
 
Practical barriers to recognising advance directives at common law 
As discussed earlier, the purpose of the legislation in the various jurisdictions is to 
enshrine the common law.  In doing so, autonomy is promoted. If there is evidence 
that advance directives are not being followed at common law, however, it is 
incumbent on legislatures to consider such evidence and, where possible, to insert 
appropriate statutory provisions to promote compliance.  In other words, to the extent 
that it is possible, the legislation should attempt to remove practical barriers to 
compliance with advance directives that existed at common law. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
[2009] WASC 229, [22].  It should be noted, however, that where the consequences of the health 
decision are grave, the level of competence that is required is correspondingly high: Re B [2002] 2 All 
ER 449, 472; Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649, 661; Hunter’s case [2009] NSWSC 761, [24].   
34 Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649, 669; Hunter’s case [2009] NSWSC 761, [26]. 
35 Hunter’s case [2009] NSWSC 761, [26].  For example, at common law, an advance directive will not 
apply if there has been a change of the individual’s circumstances which indicates that the adult would 
not have intended that the advance directive would have operated (as in HE v A Hospital NHS Trust 
[2003] 2 FLR 408); or if the advance directive were based on an incorrect assumption about the facts 
(as in Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649.  The circumstances in which a health professional is exused from 
complying with an advance directive at common law are explored in Lindy Willmott, Ben White and 
Michelle Howard, ‘Refusing Advance Refusals: Advance Directives and Life-Sustaining Medical 
Treatment’ (2006) 30 Melbourne University Law Review 211.  See also section 10 below. 
36 Hunter’s case [2009] NSWSC 761, [28]–[30].  In some of the secondary literature, it has been 
suggested that the requirement for an advance directive to be based on sufficient information is a 
prerequisite for its validity: see, for example, Ian Kennedy and Andrew Grubb, Medical Law (3rd ed, 
2000) 2037 and Sabine Michalowski, ‘Advance Refusals of Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment: The 
Relativity of an Absolute Right’ (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 958, 958.  However, this suggestion 
was expressly rejected by the New South Wales Supreme Court in Hunter’s case and it can no longer 
be argued that it reflects the common law.  The suggestion that an advance directive must be based on 
sufficient information to be valid is also contrary to legal principle regarding the refusal of treatment, 
as explored in Willmott, White and Howard, above n 35.  Compare also the comments of Martin CJ in 
Rossiter’s case where he expressed the view that a competent individual who was giving a 
contemporaneous refusal of life-sustaining treatment should be given information to assist that person 
to make his or her decision: [2009] WASC 229, [28]-[32].   
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(a) Legitimate barriers 
One important practical barrier to compliance with advance directives has been 
revealed in the case law and secondary literature.37  This barrier is the fact that, at 
least in some circumstances, medical professionals can be reluctant to adhere to a 
common law advance directive to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining medical 
treatment.  It is submitted that sometimes the reason that a medical professional will 
not follow an advance directive is understandable, and perhaps even justifiable.  For 
example, as a matter of principle, a medical professional may be willing to comply 
with an advance directive, but may have concerns about its validity or applicability in 
a particular case.  This could occur in the following cases: 
 
 The medical professional is not satisfied that an individual had the requisite 
capacity when he or she completed the advance directive. 
 
 The statements made by an individual may be too vague to provide a medical 
professional with sufficient confidence that the individual intended treatment 
to be discontinued in a given situation. 
 
 The medical professional is not satisfied that the individual in fact gave the 
advance directive as relayed by a family member or friend.  
 
For the purpose of this article, I will refer to these as ‘legitimate barriers’ to 
compliance.  They are ‘legitimate’ in the sense that the medical professional is not 
disrespecting a person’s autonomy, but has an understandable concern about whether 
a competent individual intended the directive to apply in the situation that had arisen. 
 
While the failure to follow an advance directive in such a case may be 
understandable, the result is that the individual’s wishes about treatment are not 
complied with.  If the directive was valid and applicable to the situation that had 
arisen, the decision not to comply with the directive infringes the principle of 
autonomy.  Regulation that seeks to reduce the concerns that medical professionals 
have about following an advance directive should result in increased compliance with 
advance directives.  This will promote individual autonomy.  Legislative provisions 
that address these ‘legitimate barriers’, therefore, are not offensive and can be 
justified as promoting the principle of autonomy.   
 
                                                 
37 These authorities are referred to in appropriate places later in the article. 
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(b) Illegitimate barriers 
On the other hand, it is submitted that some barriers to following advance directives 
may be illegitimate.  A medical professional may be unwilling to comply with an 
advance directive, not because he or she doubts its validity or applicability, but for 
some other reason.  Such illegitimate barriers may include the following: 
 
 The medical professional is philosophically opposed to advance directives that 
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. 
 
 It is the policy of the hospital or aged care facility in which the medical 
professional practises not to be guided by instructions in an advance directive. 
 
 The medical professional is not prepared to follow an advance directive 
because he or she is aware that the individual did not receive all relevant 
medical information before giving the directive. 
 
 The medical professional is not prepared to follow an advance directive 
because he or she is of the view that the directive is contrary to good medical 
practice. 
 
While these barriers may exist in practice, they are not legally defensible.  At 
common law, a medical professional who refuses to comply with a valid and 
applicable advance directive may be liable to both criminal and civil sanction.38  The 
position should be the same under statute.  The legislative regimes should prohibit a 
medical professional from ignoring an advance directive that refuses treatment on any 
of the grounds listed above.  The corollary to this is equally important.  Legislation 
should not allow a medical professional to ignore an advance directive on any of these 
grounds.  Given that the purpose of legislation is to enshrine the common law (and in 
doing so, promote the principle of autonomy), provisions which allow an advance 
directive to be ignored for any of the reasons listed above, or any other reason that is 
not concerned with the validity or applicability of the advance directive, could not be 
justified as promoting the principle of autonomy.   
 
Concluding remarks 
                                                 
38 In England, see Re F [1990] 2 AC 1, 73); Re T (adult: refusal of treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649, 
664–665; Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 866.  In Australia, see Secretary, Department of 
Health and Community Services (NT) v JWB (1992) 175 CLR 218, 232. 
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It is submitted that the preceding discussion provides a touchstone against which 
statutory regulation should be judged.  Legislative provisions that are designed to 
achieve either of the following goals are justified because they promote the principle 
of autonomy: 
 
Goal 1: 
To enshrine established common law principles about when an advance 
directive will be binding and applicable.  Enshrining common law principles 
will promote the principle of autonomy because that principle underpins the 
common law governing advance directives. 
 
Goal 2: 
To address legitimate barriers that have prevented or discouraged advance 
directives from being followed by medical professionals at common law.  
Legislative attempts to address these practical issues arising under the 
common law regime will lead to increased compliance with advance 
directives, therefore promoting autonomy. 
 
Legislative provisions that are designed to achieve any other goal cannot be justified 
on the basis of promoting autonomy.   
 
A detailed review of the legislative regimes is undertaken in the remainder of this 
article.  The review commences with an overview of all of the statutory regimes 
followed by a detailed examination of the provisions that affect the validity and 
operation of an advance directive.  This examination will include a critique of whether 
the relevant legislative provisions can be justified on the basis of autonomy by 
reference to whether the particular provision aims to achieve either of the goals 
enunciated above. 
  
4. Statutory regimes – an overview   
 
All statutory jurisdictions allow an individual, at least in some circumstances, to make 
an advance directive that refuses life-sustaining medical treatment.  However, there is 
considerable variation in the models that are used.  Some statutes provide only for the 
advance refusal of treatment,39 while others provide for advance consent and 
                                                 
39 Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic); Medical Treatment (Health Directions) Act 2006 (ACT); Natural 
Death Act 1989 (NT). 
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refusal.40  For this reason, there is also inconsistency in the name given to an advance 
directive by the various statutes:  South Australia refers to the document as an 
‘anticipatory direction’, 41 Western Australia and Queensland as an ‘advance health 
directive’,42 Victoria as a ‘refusal of treatment certificate’,43 ACT as a ‘health 
direction’44 and Northern Territory as a ‘notice of direction’.45 
 
The legislation in all jurisdictions contain provisions to ensure the adult has capacity 
to complete the directive and there are no vitiating factors surrounding its execution.46  
All statutes also prescribe formal requirements with which the advance directive must 
comply including whether the directive needs to be in a prescribed form, signed, dated 
and witnessed.47  One jurisdiction also requires the provision of information to an 
individual who wishes to make an advance directive.48  Although all jurisdictions 
allow an advance directive refusing life-sustaining medical treatment to operate in 
some circumstances, most jurisdictions place significant restrictions on this.  In 
Victoria, an advance directive can only be completed if a person is suffering from a 
current medical condition.  In South Australia, the Northern Territory and 
Queensland, although an advance directive refusing treatment can be completed at 
any time, it can only operate when an individual is in the terminal stages of a terminal 
illness (South Australia), suffering from a terminal illness (Northern Territory), or is 
seriously ill, with that illness or disease being of a specified kind (Queensland).  It is 
only in Western Australia and the ACT that the legislation does not contain 
restrictions on when an individual’s directive refusing life-sustaining treatment can 
operate.49 
 
Most statutes expressly require that an individual’s advance directive be complied 
with, though the statutes generally contain provisions which outline when a medical 
                                                 
40 Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA); Guardianship and Administration 
Act 1990 (WA) pt 9B; Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) chap 3. 
41 Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Regulations 2004 (SA) Form 1. 
42 See Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) pt 9B and Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) 
s 28 respectively. 
43 Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) Sch 1. 
44 Medical Treatment (Health Directions) Act 2006 (ACT) s 7. 
45 Natural Death Regulations 1989 (NT) Sch. 
46 The requirements regarding validity and vitiating factors are detailed in section 5 below. 
47 These formality requirements are detailed in detail in section 6 below.  
48 These requirements are detailed in detail in section 7 below. 
49 The restrictions contained in each statute are detailed in sections 8 and 9 below.  
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professional may be justified in departing from the directive.  Such factors may 
include uncertainty regarding the directive or a change of circumstances that have 
occurred since the individual completed the directive.50  In Queensland, a medical 
professional is also excused from following an advance directive where the directive 
is inconsistent with good medical practice. 
 
A final issue to mention is the relationship between the statutory regimes and the 
common law, following the enactment of legislation.  Prior to legislative reform, it is 
likely that a competent adult had a common law right to give an advance directive 
refusing life-sustaining medical treatment.51  Most of the statutes make reference to 
the common law position.  The legislation in Western Australia and Queensland 
expressly preserve the common law on advance directives.52  It should be noted, 
however, that there is doubt whether the relevant provision in Queensland was 
effective in preserving the common law in that State.53  In Victoria, ACT and 
Northern Territory, while not referring to the common law expressly, the legislation 
provides that its enactment does not affect other rights that an individual may have to 
refuse treatment. 54  This, presumably, is a reference to previously-existing common 
law rights so that, at first glance, the common law right regarding advance directives 
remains.  Despite this, however, it has been suggested that the common law might be 
negated because of the substitute decision-making regime established by the 
Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic).55  Although the South Australian 
legislation is silent on whether the common law is preserved, it is likely that the 
                                                 
50 The provisions that excuse a medical professional from not following an advance directive are 
considered in section 10 below. 
51 See above n 4.  Note, however, the uncertainty that surrounded the common law as referred to in 
many of the parliamentary debates that were considered in section 2 above. 
52 Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) s 110ZB and Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 
39 respectively. 
53 Despite section 39 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) which purports to preserve the common law, it 
is likely that, due to a drafting error when enacting Queensland’s guardianship regime (comprised of 
Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) and the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld)), the 
common law regime no longer applies in Queensland: see Ben White and Lindy Willmott, ‘Will you do 
as I ask? Compliance with instructions about health care in Queensland’ (2004) 4 Queensland 
University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 77. 
54 Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 4; Medical Treatment (Health Directions) Act 2006 (ACT) s 6; 
Natural Death Act 1989 (NT) s 5. 
55 This appears to be the position taken by the Office of the Public Advocate in Victoria as expressed in 
the Office of Public Advocate Practice Guidelines, chap 12: Not for Resuscitation, p 12.4 (available at 
www.publicadvocate.vic.gov.au). 
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common law would continue unless it was expressly or implicitly repealed.56  The 
result is likely to be that in all statutory jurisdictions, with the probable exception of 
Queensland57 and the possible exception of Victoria,58 the common law operates 
alongside the statutory regimes. 
 
In the following sections of the article, separate attention is given to the different 
types of regulation that affect advance directives.  To more easily facilitate a 
comparison across statutory jurisdictions, a table summarising the various regulatory 
provisions appears in an appendix to this article. 
 
5. Requirements of capacity and absence of vitiating factors 
 
At common law, an advance directive will only be binding if it is made by a 
competent adult.  The adult must have had capacity at the time of completion and 
have been able to communicate his or her formulated treatment directive.59  It is 
axiomatic that only a competent individual should be able to complete an advance 
directive.  Respect for individual autonomy only has traction if a person has the 
ability to make a choice.  Competence is therefore a prerequisite for the principle of 
autonomy to operate.  As would be expected, the requirement of competence, though 
couched in a variety of legal terms, exists in all of the statutes.60  These legislative 
provisions can be justified as promoting the principle of autonomy as they aim to 
achieve goal 1 as outlined in section 3 above.  That is, they enshrine a common law 
principle relating to validity of an advance directive, namely that a person must 
possess the requisite capacity. 
 
                                                 
56 Cameron Stewart ‘The Australian experience of advance directives and possible future directions’ 
(2005) 24 Australasian Journal on Ageing S25.   
57 See above n 53. 
58 See above n 55. 
59 See above n 32-33 and accompanying text. 
60 Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) s 7(1); Guardianship and 
Administration Act 1990 (WA) s 110P; Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5(1)(d); Natural Death Act 
1989 (NT) s 4(1); Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 42. See also Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) 
Sch 3 definition of ‘capacity’. While the position is not free from doubt, it is submitted that the maker 
of an advance directive must have capacity as defined in sch 3 as well as satisfying the requirements of 
s 42.  For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Willmott, White and Howard, above n 35.   Note 
that the ACT legislation, instead of requiring the individual to have capacity, provides that a health 
direction cannot be made by an individual with impaired decision-making capacity: Medical Treatment 
(Health Directions) Act 2006 (ACT) s 7(3). 
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In a similar vein, the common law will not recognise and require adherence to an 
advance directive if undue influence or another vitiating factor was exerted on the 
individual at the time of its completion.  Again, the failure to recognise the validity of 
an advance directive completed in such circumstances is consistent with the principle 
of autonomy.  A directive which does not represent a person’s true choice cannot be 
regarded as the autonomous choice of that individual.  Four of the six statutes provide 
for advance directives that have been entered into as a result of some kind of vitiating 
conduct.61  As with the issue of capacity, various approaches are taken in regulating 
such conduct.  Regardless of the approach used, however, these legislative provisions 
can also be justified as promoting the principle of autonomy as they aim to achieve 
goal 1, as outlined in section 3 above. 
 
6. Requirements of form and witnessing 
 
No requirements regarding formality exist at common law.  If an advance directive is 
valid and is applicable to the medical situation that has arisen, it must be followed.  
By contrast, the legislation in all States and Territories contain requirements that 
relate to formal matters, though disparate approaches are taken.  At first glance, the 
imposition of legislative requirements that do not exist at common law would suggest 
that an individual’s autonomy is being eroded.  The stated desires of an individual 
will not receive statutory protection unless there is compliance with the statutory 
requirements.  However, as argued below, if the effect of this regulation is to enshrine 
common law principles regarding validity and applicability, or to remove legitimate 
barriers that prevent compliance with an advance directive at common law, such 
regulation may enhance rather than erode an individual’s autonomy.   
 
The nature of statutory regulation relating to form, signature and dating, and 
witnessing, and whether that regulation promotes or erodes the principle of autonomy 
are considered next. 
 
                                                 
61 Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) s 110R; Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 
5(1)(b); Medical Treatment (Health Directions) Act 2006 (ACT) s 20.  Compare the Powers of 
Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) sch 3 where the definition of ‘capacity’ includes a reference to ‘freely and 
voluntarily being able to make decisions about a matter’.  See n 60 above as to whether the maker of a 
directive must possess capacity as defined in sch 3. The legislation in South Australia and Northern 
Territory are silent on the issue of undue influence. 
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Form 
The legislation in all jurisdictions except Queensland requires an advance directive, if 
made in writing, to be completed in the prescribed form.62  In Queensland, although 
the advance directive must be in writing, it ‘may’, but need not be, in the prescribed 
form.63  While the legislative provisions differ across the various jurisdictions, 
generally speaking, a refusal of treatment that is given in a prescribed form is deemed 
to constitute a refusal of treatment that can be relied upon by a medical professional.64 
 
Little is known about the extent to which common law directives refusing life-
sustaining medical treatment that are made by competent adults are followed by 
medical professionals, or are simply disregarded.  One of the criticisms commonly 
made about the usefulness of advance directives is that they do not provide medical 
professionals with useful information.65  An advance directive therefore may not 
provide helpful guidance regarding a person’s desired treatment.  This may result in 
the advance directive being ignored by a medical professional.66   
 
                                                 
62 Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) s 7(2); Guardianship and 
Administration Act 1990 (WA) s 110Q(1)(a) although note that it is sufficient if the directive is 
‘substantially’ in the form prescribed by regulations; Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5(2); Medical 
Treatment (Health Directions) Act 2006 (ACT) ss 8 and 21, Approved Form 2007 No 55; Natural 
Death Act 1989 (NT) s 4(1).  The ACT legislation allows advance directives to be either in writing or 
oral, so the requirement to be in the prescribed form applies only to a written advance directive: 
Medical Treatment (Health Directions) Act 2006 (ACT) ss 7(2) and 8.   
63 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 44(2). 
64 Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) s 7(3); Guardianship and 
Administration Act 1990 (WA) s 110S(1); Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 8; Medical Treatment 
(Health Directions) Act 2006 (ACT) s 16; Natural Death Act 1989 (NT) s 4(3).  Although the 
Queensland legislation does not require adherence to a prescribed form, the legislation provides that a 
direction in an advance health directive has the same effect as if the individual had capacity and 
provided consent. [In this context, consent includes a refusal of consent to treatment.]: Powers of 
Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 101. 
65 See, for example, R Dresser, ‘Precommitment: A Misguided Strategy for Securing Death With 
Dignity’ (2003) 81 Texas Law Review 7; ABI / INFORM Global 1823, 1830-1831; R Dresser, 
‘Dworkin on Dementia: Elegant theory, questionable policy’ (1995) 25 The Hastings Center Report 6.  
66 There is some authority to support this proposition.  When carrying out its review into a number of 
issues relating to treatment of dying patients in Victoria, the Social Development Committee referred to 
practical concerns that may arise that an advance directive may not represent a person’s current wishes 
to discontinue treatment: Parliament of Victoria, Inquiry into Options for Dying and Dignity, Second 
and Final Report, 1987, 50, 120-121, 196.  There is also some support for this proposition in the case 
law.  See, for example, W Healthcare NHS Trust v H [2005] 1 WLR 834, a case involving a woman 
who had indicated that she did not want to be kept alive by machines.  The medical professionals were 
of the view that this directive was not sufficiently clear to justify not reinserting a feeding tube which 
had been dislodged.  The Court of Appeal agreed with the view taken by the medical professionals in 
this case. 
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Legislative provisions that prescribe forms (or, at the very least, require an advance 
directive to be in writing) are likely to result in clearer and more focused directives.  
The forms used generally direct an individual to answer a specific inquiry.  The form 
prescribed in Queensland is even more particular as it seeks to elicit responses about 
specific types of treatment.  Thus, the completed form is likely to result in more 
specific instructions being given.  The prescribing of forms generally will encourage 
individuals to think carefully about their wishes regarding treatment, and to translate 
those wishes into specific instructions.  The use of forms therefore may achieve both 
goals 1 and 2, as articulated in section 3 above.  An individual is more likely to 
complete a valid advance directive which is sufficiently clear so as to indicate 
treatment choice at a later time.  Secondly, the increased clarity may also address a 
legitimate barrier to compliance by medical professionals.  Accordingly, the 
legislative provisions requiring an advance directive to be in writing or in a prescribed 
form can be justified as promoting the principle of autonomy.   
 
Signature and date  
If the advance directive is in writing, there is a legislative requirement that it must be 
signed (and generally dated) by the maker of the directive.67   
 
It may be the case that some medical professionals are uncomfortable about following 
a directive if they are unable to satisfy themselves that the directive represents the 
treatment wishes of the now incompetent patient.  Concerns are sometimes also 
expressed about whether an advance directive represents the current wishes of an 
individual.  Where a medical professional does not have information about when an 
advance directive was given, he or she may have legitimate concerns about whether 
the individual retains the views previously articulated in the advance directive.   
                                                 
67 For the signature requirement, see Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) 
s 7(2) and Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Regulations 2004 (SA) sch 1; 
Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) s 110Q(1)(c); Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 
5(2) and sch 1; Medical Treatment (Health Directions) Act 2006 (ACT) s 8(a); Natural Death Act 1989 
(NT) and Natural Death Regulations 1989 (NT) sch; Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 44(3)(a). For 
the dating requirement, see Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) s 7(2) 
and Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Regulations 2004 (SA) sch 1; Medical 
Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5(2) and sch 1; Medical Treatment (Health Directions) Act 2006 (ACT) ss 
8 and 21, Approved Form 2007 No 55; Natural Death Act 1989 (NT) and Natural Death Regulations 
1989 (NT) sch.  At the time of writing, a form under the WA legislation has not yet been prescribed, so 
it is not known whether the person completing the directive will be required to date the document.  
Compare Queensland where the prescribed form has a provision for the witness, not the individual to 
insert a date: Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 44(3)(b). 
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The requirement that an individual sign and date an advance directive may remove 
some of this uncertainty or discomfort.  From a strictly legal perspective, signing a 
document traditionally indicates assent to its terms. The signature requirement 
(combined with the witnessing requirement considered below) may result in a medical 
professional feeling more confident that the advance directive represents the wishes of 
the individual.  If the advance directive contains a date, this will also provide a level 
of certainty.  For an advance directive completed in the relatively recent past, a 
medical professional may feel more confident that the directive represented the 
wishes of the individual before losing capacity.  It may therefore be more likely that it 
is followed.  This is not to say that a medical professional is justified in not following 
an older advance directive.  The submission is simply that dating an advance 
directive, which is required by legislation but not at common law, may have a positive 
impact on whether a medical professional complies with the directive.   
 
Legislative provisions about signing and dating an advance directive are likely to 
result in a medical professional having more confidence in the authenticity and 
currency of the advance directive.   This, in turn, may mean that it is more likely that 
the advance directive is followed by the medical professional.  Accordingly, the 
removal or reduction of a legitimate barrier by requiring the document to be signed 
and dated can be justified as promotion the principle of autonomy.  The regulation 
aims to achieve goal 2, as outlined in section 3 above. 
 
 
Witnessing  
All statutes also contain witnessing requirements.  Generally, the provisions require 
the witnesses to witness that the advance directive was signed by the individual in 
their presence.68  However, in some jurisdictions there are more onerous obligations 
on a witness, namely to attest to the fact that the individual possessed capacity to 
                                                 
68 Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) s 7(1)(2)(b) and Consent to 
Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Regulations 2004 (SA) sch 1; Guardianship and 
Administration Act 1990 (WA) s 110Q(1)(d) and (e); Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5(1); 
Medical Treatment (Health Directions) Act 2006 (ACT) s 8(c); Natural Death Act 1989 (NT) s 4(2); 
Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 44(3) and (4). 
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complete the directive 69 and, in some cases, was not the subject of undue influence or 
other vitiating factor when completing the directive.70   
 
It is clearly desirable to ensure that the individual purporting to refuse life-sustaining 
medical treatment actually did so.  The narrower witnessing obligation provides 
assurance that this is the case.  It is also clearly desirable for the person refusing life-
sustaining medical treatment to have the requisite capacity to refuse that treatment.  
While there is a presumption that an adult has capacity to do so,71 having a witness 
testify to that fact provides an additional safeguard.   
 
The statutory witnessing requirements can be justified as they achieve both 1 and 2, as 
outlined in section 3 above.  Witnessing a person’s capacity is relevant to ensuring the 
validity of the directive, and is consistent with the objective of ensuring common law 
principles are legislatively enshrined.  In addition, the witnessing requirements will 
give a medical professional greater confidence that the advance directive was 
completed by the individual whose name appears on the document.  Where the 
witness testifies as to capacity, the medical professional should take additional 
comfort that the adult possessed the requisite capacity at the relevant time.  For 
reasons articulated earlier in relation to the signing and dating requirement, the 
witnessing requirements are likely to make medical professionals more comfortable 
about following the advance directive.  In this way, a further legitimate barrier to 
complying with an advance directive is removed or decreased.  Accordingly, the 
witnessing requirements can be justified as promoting the principle of autonomy.   
 
 
Concluding comments 
Common law advance directives do not have to satisfy any formal requirements to be 
valid.  To this extent, the requirements imposed by legislation place restrictions on the 
extent to which an individual’s advance directive will operate.  However, as discussed 
above, the formal requirements are primarily designed as a safeguard to ensure that 
the directive is given by the person stated on the document, and to decrease the scope 
                                                 
69 Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) s 7(1)(2)(b) and Consent to 
Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Regulations 2004 (SA) sch 1; Medical Treatment Act 1988 
(Vic) s 5(1); Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 44(3), (4) and (6). 
70 Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5(1); Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 44(3), (4) and (6). 
71 See above n 33. 
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for uncertainty by requiring adherence to a specified form.  These provisions assist in 
enshrining common law principles, and may improve the likelihood that a medical 
professional will follow the directive.  Accordingly, it is submitted that the formality 
requirements do not offend the principle of autonomy.   
 
7. Requirement to provide information   
 
At common law, an individual does not have to be provided with information about 
his or her condition or treatment options for an advance directive to be valid or 
applicable.72  The same approach is taken in most, but not all statutory jurisdictions.  
The statutory regimes fall into one of three models.  The first model does not impose 
any prerequisite for the validity of an advance directive that the individual first 
receive medical information.  This model reflects the common law and has been 
adopted in South Australia, the ACT, the Northern Territory and Queensland.73  The 
second model requires medical information to be provided before the advance 
directive can be witnessed.  This model has been adopted only in Victoria.74  The 
third model, adopted only in Western Australia, ‘encourages’ an individual to obtain 
medical advice prior to completing an advance directive, but failure to seek or receive 
that advice does not make the advance directive invalid.75 
 
The policy underpinning the Victorian requirement that the individual receive 
information is obvious.  It is to ensure that an advance directive to refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment is not undertaken lightly, and represents a fully 
considered desire of a person, such consideration being undertaken after receiving all 
                                                 
72 See above n 36 and accompanying text. 
73 By way of observation, some of the statutes specifically refer to a medical professional’s duty to 
inform a competent patient about treatment options, even if that person has previously made an 
advance directive: Medical Treatment (Health Directions) Act 2006 (ACT) s 11 and Natural Death Act 
1989 (NT) s 4(4).  In South Australia, while the legislation also imposes on a medical professional a 
duty to explain medical treatment options either to the patient or the patient’s representative, it is 
unlikely that this provision has any relevance in the context of an advance directive refusing treatment: 
Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) s 15.   
74 Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5(1)(c).  An advance directive can only be completed by an 
individual who has a particular condition, and s 5(1)(c) requires information to be given about the 
condition to the extent which is reasonably sufficient to enable the patient to make a decision about 
whether or not to refuse medical treatment.  Moreover, s 5(1) requires the witness to be satisfied that 
the individual has received the information and appeared to understand it. 
75 Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) ss 110Q(1)(b) and (2) and 110QA.  Note the 
peculiar drafting of the legislation.  Section 110Q(1)(b) provides that an advance directive is not valid 
unless, among other things, the maker is encouraged to seek legal or medical advice.  Section 110Q(2) 
then provides that, despite s 110Q(1)(b), the validity of the advance directive is not affected by a 
failure to comply with that subsection. 
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relevant information.  To this extent, the state is attempting to safeguard the lives of 
its citizens, which is one of the principles that is relevant to legal regulation in this 
field.76  This safeguard is understandable.  However, the question is whether it is 
sustainable when assessed against the principle of autonomy.  To make this 
assessment, the touchstones against which statutory regulation should be judged, as 
outlined in section 3 will be used.  It will be recalled that legislative regulation could 
be justified as promoting principles of autonomy if the purpose of the regulation was 
to promote either goal 1 or goal 2.  Each of these goals will be considered in turn. 
 
Goal 1 relates to legislatively enshrining common law principles.  If the common law, 
which is shaped on and driven by principles of autonomy, requires the provision of 
medical information as a prerequisite for validity of an advance directive, an 
equivalent statutory provision could be justified.  However, this is not the case.  While 
there has been some mixed judicial and academic commentary on whether an advance 
directive needs to be based on sufficient information,77 the New South Wales 
Supreme Court in Hunter’s case has recently clarified the situation.  The Court 
confirmed that an advance directive will be valid, whether or not an individual 
receives information prior to its completion.  In other words, an advance directive will 
be valid even if the adult had not received medical information that was relevant to 
treatment decisions prior to making the directive.  Regulation imposing the receipt of 
information by an adult as a prerequisite to the validity of an advance directive cannot 
therefore be justified to achieve goal 1. 
 
Legislative reform can also be justified as promoting principles of autonomy if it is 
designed to remove legitimate barriers that have prevented or discouraged advance 
directives from being followed by medical professionals, as described in goal 2.  A 
medical professional may feel uncomfortable about following an individual’s advance 
directive unless that person has been fully informed about possible treatment options.  
A medical professional may also feel uncomfortable about following an advance 
directive if the person did not have any particular disease or illness at the time the 
directive was made, and now suffers from such a disease or illness which requires a 
treatment decision to be made.  Clearly, the individual would not have been informed 
                                                 
76 See section 1 above. 
77 See above n 36. 
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of the illness or disease as he or she was not suffering from it at the relevant time.  
However, that discomfort should not influence a medical professional’s decision to 
comply or not comply with the directive.  At common law, if the doctor is satisfied 
that the directive is valid and applicable to the medical situation that has arisen, it 
must be followed.78  The doctor does not have any discretion in the matter.  If the lack 
of information was a barrier to following the directive, it would be an illegitimate 
barrier, as described in section 3.  Accordingly, regulation imposing the receipt of 
information as a prerequisite to the validity of an advance directive cannot be justified 
to achieve goal 2. 
 
The following example illustrates the infringement on autonomous choice that can 
result from the Victorian legislation. 
 
Jack is 65 and has been diagnosed with lung cancer.  His father, who Jack nursed for 
many years, has just died from the same disease. Jack, unlike his father, has decided 
that he does not want to receive any life-sustaining treatment should he suffer from an 
acute event.  He would rather die quickly than suffer over many years, as did his 
father.  He is competent to make a treatment decision but does not wish to discuss his 
decision with his doctor.  
 
As demonstrated earlier, legislation was enacted to clarify existing common law 
rights.  The Victorian Government was concerned that the common law was 
uncertain, and that, in some cases, doctors were reluctant to comply with advance 
directives.  Yet, in the above case, Jack is unable to take advantage of the legislative 
framework.  Jack does not wish to discuss his diagnosis or treatment options, so will 
be unable to complete the refusal of treatment certificate that is prescribed by the 
Victorian legislation.  It is submitted that imposing this kind of restriction represents 
an unjustifiable infringement on Jack’s autonomy.  His choice not to receive 
information about treatment should be respected, and he should be able to complete a 
refusal of treatment certificate, and obtain the benefits of the statutory regime. 
 
It is understandable that the state, in this case, Victoria, would like to encourage the 
provision of information to a competent adult before he or she makes an advance 
refusal of life-sustaining treatment.  As a community, we might feel more comfortable 
                                                 
78 Note that there are some circumstances in which a medical professional is excused for not following 
an advance directive.  These are explored in section 10 below. 
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knowing that such a significant decision is reached after an individual has all of the 
relevant information and has considered all treatment options.  However, to take this 
encouragement one step further and make the provision of information a prerequisite 
to the operation of an advance directive offends the principle of autonomy.  Such a 
provision cannot be justified as achieving either goal 1 or goal 2, and therefore erodes 
rather than promotes the principle of autonomy. 
 
8. Circumstances in which an advance directive can be completed  
 
At common law, a competent individual is permitted to complete an advance directive 
at any time.  There is no requirement for the individual to be suffering from a 
particular disease or illness.  This is also the case in all but one statutory jurisdiction.  
In Victoria, an individual may only complete a ‘refusal of treatment certificate’ in 
relation to a ‘current condition’.79  While the certificate enables the person to refuse 
medical treatment generally or medical treatment of a particular kind, the treatment 
refused must relate to a current condition.   
 
There is little explanation available from the parliamentary debates regarding why the 
legislation is limited in this fashion.  As has been observed earlier, the Bill was based 
on recommendations contained in the Report of the Social Development Committee, 
the Committee charged with inquiring into a number of issues relating to treatment of 
dying patients.  One of the recommendations of the Committee was that the right to 
refuse treatment should not take the form of an ‘advance declaration’, namely a 
‘declaration made while healthy about what should happen if one becomes ill’.80  
When considering this restriction in Parliament, it was observed that ‘the Bill allows 
for the right to refuse treatment to be exercised only within the context of necessary 
treatment’.81  There was no further discussion of the reason for limiting the operation 
of the refusal of treatment certificate in this way.   
 
It is difficult to understand why the Victorian legislation is limited to an individual 
who has a current condition.  One of the objectives of the legislation, as 
                                                 
79 Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 5(1)(a). 
80 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 23 March 1988, 335 (Evan Walker).  The 
same words were used when the Bill was read in the Legislative Assembly for the second time: 
Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 5 May 1988, 2167 (Andrew McCutcheon).     
81 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 23 March 1988, 335 (Evan Walker).  See also 
Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 5 May 1988, 2167 (Andrew McCutcheon).   
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acknowledged by the Minister for Agriculture and Rural Affairs, the Hon EH Walker, 
when reading the Bill for the second time in the Legislative Council, was to clarify the 
existing common law right to refuse medical treatment.  However, the common law 
right extends not only to giving instructions about treatment for a current condition, 
but also to giving instructions about treatment for illnesses, diseases or other 
conditions from which a person may suffer at some time in the future.  If the purpose 
of the legislation was to enshrine this common law right, the legislative regime should 
not have been restricted to an individual with a current condition. 
 
The Hon EH Walker referred to the findings of the Social Development Committee 
that many often patients were frustrated because they felt that their ‘clear refusals to 
undergo further medical treatment [were] ignored or not acted upon by medical 
practitioners’.82  Similarly, medical professionals were reluctant to act upon those 
refusals because of concerns about the patient’s competence or wishes.83  The 
Committee recommended that these concerns be addressed by the completion of a 
duly witnessed refusal of treatment certificate.  The certificate would provide clarity 
about the patient’s wishes, and the witnessing requirements would provide comfort 
about the patient’s capacity.  However, these concerns are not logically limited to 
directives concerning current treatment.  A Jehovah’s Witness, for example, may 
wish to give directives about refusing blood products and perhaps refusing certain 
kinds of procedures that are unrelated to a current condition.  A medical professional 
could have similar concerns about the precise nature or ambit of the person’s wishes, 
and whether he or she had competence when the directive was given, or possibly was 
the subject of undue influence.  Nevertheless, such a directive does not fall within the 
ambit of the legislation.  An individual in such a case, therefore, is unable to take 
advantage of the protection offered by the statutory framework.   
 
The limitation of the Victorian legislation that is considered here is unlike the 
restrictions considered in other parts of this article.  The latter restrictions relate to 
when an advance directive refusing treatment that is completed by an individual can 
be followed.  The restriction being considered here is that a wide range of individuals 
are excluded from falling within the scope of the legislation.  A person who does not 
                                                 
82 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 23 March 1988, 333 (Evan Walker).   
83 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 23 March 1988, 333-334 (Evan Walker). 
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have a ‘current condition’ is not permitted to complete a statutory advance directive.  
Such individuals therefore cannot obtain the benefits of protection of the statutory 
regime.  As was considered in section 2, legislation was enacted because of the lack 
of certainty regarding whether common law directives would be recognised.  Despite 
the recent decision in Hunter’s case, it is likely that, in the clinical context, common 
law directives will still be treated with the same caution as in the past.  A person who 
has not completed a statutory refusal of treatment certificate, therefore, might 
encounter difficulty in having their advance directive observed.  The exclusion of a 
group of individuals who do not currently suffer from a condition from the ambit of 
the legislative regime does not promote their right to make an autonomous choice and, 
therefore, cannot be justified.  The statutory regime should be more broadly based, 
and allow any competent individual the right to complete an advance directive.  
 
 
9. Circumstances in which an advance directive can operate 
 
It is likely that most individuals would complete an advance directive refusing 
medical treatment on the assumption that it would be followed, according to its terms, 
if he or she loses decision-making capacity at a later time, and a decision about 
treatment needs to be made.  Indeed, this is generally the case at common law.  
However, this is not always the case under the legislation, and the six jurisdictions 
take a variety of approaches on this point.  The legislation in Western Australia and 
the ACT are the most progressive as they require an advance directive refusing 
treatment to be followed by medical professionals in all circumstances, if the 
individual lacks consent and there is a need for a treatment decision to be made.84  A 
refusal of treatment certificate completed in accordance with the Victorian legislation 
must be followed, though, as outlined above, such a certificate can only be completed 
when the adult suffers from a current medical condition.  South Australia, the NT and 
Queensland also restrict when an advance directive refusing treatment can operate.  
While the language varies between these three jurisdictions, the person must be close 
to death before the directive can be followed.85  
                                                 
84 There are, however, circumstances in which the directive need not be followed by a medical 
professional.  These are considered in the next section. 
85 In South Australia, a person must be in the terminal phase of a terminal illness: Consent to Medical 
Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) s 7(1)(a).  ‘Terminal phase of a terminal illness’ is 
defined to mean the phase of the illness reached when there is no real prospect of recovery or remission 
of symptoms (on either a permanent or temporary basis); ‘terminal illness’ is defined to mean an illness 
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The variations between jurisdictions will result in different outcomes for individuals 
in many, if not most, cases where an individual makes an advance directive refusing 
life-sustaining treatment.  The following example is illustrative. 
 
Mark was diagnosed with dementia when he was 60.  He researched the illness and 
told his family that when he reached the stage of the illness when he was no longer 
able to make medical decisions for himself, he did not want to receive any life-
sustaining medical treatment.  Instead, he wanted to be given palliative care and kept 
comfortable, and be allowed to die.  Mark completed an advance directive to that 
effect. 
 
In Western Australia and the ACT, Mark’s directive must be followed as there is no 
statutory requirement for Mark to be at a particular stage in his illness for it to 
operate.  The position is the same in Victoria.  As Mark was suffering from dementia 
at the time he completed the refusal of treatment certificate, it would be binding.86  
This is not the case for South Australia, the Northern Territory or Queensland.  
Dementia is a condition that can continue for many years after a person loses his or 
her decision-making capacity.  It is therefore unlikely that the person would satisfy 
the requirements of the respective statutes regarding when the advance directive could 
operate.  Mark intends his directive to operate as soon as he loses decision-making 
ability, yet the legislation in those jurisdictions only facilitate it being followed if 
Mark is in the terminal stage of a terminal illness (or is seriously ill as described in the 
Queensland legislation).  In summary, in the example given, Mark’s advance directive 
                                                                                                                                            
or condition that is likely to result in death: Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 
1995 (SA) s 4.  In the Northern Territory, a person must be suffering from a terminal illness: Natural 
Death Act 1989 (NT) s 4(1).  ‘Terminal illness’ is defined to mean such an illness, injury or 
degeneration of mental or physical faculties (a) that death would, if extraordinary measures were not 
undertaken, be imminent; and (b) from which there is no reasonable prospect of a temporary or 
permanent recovery, even if extraordinary measures were undertaken.  In Queensland, the requirements 
that must be satisfied before an advance directive to withhold or withdraw a life-sustaining measure 
can operate are complex.  There are two or three requirements (depending on the measure being 
withdrawn).  First, the person must fall within one of the following categories: person has a terminal 
illness or condition that is incurable or irreversible and as a result of which, in the opinion of a doctor 
treating the person and another doctor, the person may reasonably be expected to die within 1 year; or 
the person is in a persistent vegetative state; or the person is permanently unconscious; or the person 
has an illness or injury of such severity that there is no reasonable prospect that the person will recover 
to the extent that the person’s life can be sustained without the continued application of life-sustaining 
measures.  Secondly, the person has no reasonable prospect of regaining capacity to make a decision 
about treatment.  Thirdly, if the measure is artificial nutrition and hydration, the commencement or 
continuation of the measure would be inconsistent with good medical practice: Powers of Attorney Act 
1998 (Qld) s 36(2).  For a detailed consideration of the restrictions that are imposed by the Queensland 
legislation, see Lindy Willmott, ‘Advance Directives to Withhold Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment: 
Eroding autonomy through statutory reform’ (2007) 10 Flinders Journal of Law Reform 287. 
86 See section 8 above. 
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would be followed in Western Australia, ACT and Victoria, but not in South 
Australia, the Northern Territory or Queensland. 
 
The question to be asked, then, is whether the restrictions imposed by the legislation 
in South Australia, the Northern Territory and Queensland can be justified on the 
basis of promoting an individual’s autonomous right to refuse treatment.  
Parliamentary debates provide some, albeit limited, assistance in establishing the 
reason for limiting the legislation in this way.  The debates in both the Legislative 
Assembly and the Legislative Council in South Australia simply observe that a person 
may choose to withhold consent to treatment in the event of suffering a terminal 
illness.87  Similarly, in his second reading speech introducing the legislation into the 
Northern Territory Parliament, the Attorney-General simply observed that a directive 
could only have effect if death were ‘imminent’.88  Interestingly, later in the speech, 
the Attorney-General referred to this restriction (along with others contained in the 
legislation) as ‘safeguards’.89  In Queensland, the Bill that was originally introduced 
did not contain restrictions about when an advance directive refusing life-sustaining 
treatment would operate.  Amendments were later introduced by the Attorney-
General, the Hon DE Beanland.  When doing so, he commented that the amendment 
‘will also guard against the possibility, remote though it may be, of a person 
attempting to give a direction for the refusal of life-sustaining measures in a situation 
in which the person’s health can be restored by simple medical procedures.’90 
 
It is obvious both from the terms of the legislation itself and the limited reference to 
the restrictions in the various parliamentary debates, that it was the intention of the 
legislatures that a person’s wishes to refuse treatment should only operate when they 
are close to death.  In none of these jurisdictions is any explanation given for this 
position.  The only logical explanation for taking such a position is that the 
legislatures consider it ‘acceptable’ for a person who is close to death to refuse 
                                                 
87 South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 3 November 1994, 990 (Stephen 
Baker) and South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 5 August 1993, 60 
(Christopher Sumner). 
88 Northern Territory, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 17 August 1998, 3537 (Daryl 
Manzie).   
89 Northern Territory, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 17 August 1998, 3538 (Daryl 
Manzie).   
90 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 8 October 1987, 3687 (Denver 
Beanland). 
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treatment, but not ‘acceptable’ for a person to refuse such treatment in other 
circumstances.  Applying this reasoning to the example above, the legislatures in 
these three jurisdictions do not think that it is ‘acceptable’ to follow Mark’s advance 
directive.  He may not be close to death.  Mark may be able to live for many years 
despite his diagnosis of dementia.  On the other hand, if Mark was in the terminal 
phase of cancer, his directive could be followed by medical professionals. 
 
It appears, therefore, that in these three jurisdictions, quality of life assessments are 
being made.  If a person is close to death, it is acceptable that treatment be withheld or 
withdrawn.  In other situations, it is not.  Life, in these other situations, should be 
protected. 
 
The competing principles of autonomy and sanctity of life were considered earlier.  It 
was noted that, under the common law, a competent adult’s right to determine 
medical treatment (which stems from the principle of autonomy) prevails over the 
interest that the state has in preserving the lives of its citizens (which stems from the 
principle of sanctity of life).  By limiting the circumstances in which an advance 
directive can be followed, parliaments are altering this balance.  In situations where a 
person is not close to death, the effect of the legislation is to allow the principle of 
sanctity of life to prevail over the principle of autonomy.  This is a surprising position 
to take, given that in almost all jurisdictions, the legislatures purported to be 
enshrining common law rights to refuse treatment by enacting the legislation.  Instead, 
in South Australia, Northern Territory and Queensland, the common law rights were 
selectively (and narrowly) enshrined.  An advance directive refusing treatment will 
not receive the benefit of statutory endorsement if the person is not sufficiently ill.  
The autonomy of those individuals has been subjugated to the interest of the state in 
preserving life.   
 
The intention of legislative reform in these three jurisdictions, in relation to when an 
advance directive that refuses life-sustaining treatment operates, is not to enshrine the 
common law on advance directives (goal 1), nor to remove legitimate barriers that 
have prevented advance directives from being followed (goal 2).  Instead, the 
intention is to prioritise the principle of sanctity of life over that of autonomy where 
the person who has made the advance directive is not close to death.  To this extent, 
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the autonomous right of the individual to refuse treatment has been eroded.  Such 
restrictions cannot be justified on principles of autonomy. 
 
10. Circumstances in which an advance directive can be ignored 
 
Even where an advance directive that refuses treatment is valid and operative, at 
common law there are some circumstances where a medical professional is excused 
(or prevented) from following it.  At common law, the critical issue is whether the 
maker of the advance directive would have intended it to apply in the situation that 
has later arisen.91  There is a range of situations in which the maker of the directive 
may not have intended the directive to be followed.  For example, the circumstances 
of the person may have changed to the extent that he or she would not have intended 
the advance directive refusing treatment to apply in the changed circumstances.92  
Secondly, the language of the advance directive might be uncertain and it is 
impossible for a medical professional to be confident that the person would have 
wanted the directive refusing treatment to be followed.93  Thirdly, it is possible that 
the advance directive was based on incorrect information or assumptions.  If the 
person had been apprised of the correct information, he or she may not have given the 
directive.94 
 
There is considerable statutory divergence regarding the circumstances in which a 
medical professional is excused for not complying with an advance directive.  Not all 
statutes contain the same excuses, and where there are similar excuses, they are 
generally couched in different language.  Despite this divergence, three broad 
statutory categories can be identified that justify non-compliance with an advance 
directive.  First, most statutes provide that if the individual intends to revoke the 
                                                 
91 These circumstances are explored at length in Willmott, White and Howard, above n 35. 
92 See, for example, HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] 2 FLR 408 where a Muslim woman who was 
raised by a Jehovah’s Witness completed a formal advance directive refusing blood products.  This 
advance directive was held not to be applicable at a later time because, since completing the advance 
directive, she had become engaged to a Muslim man and had promised to no longer attend meetings of 
the Jehovah’s Witnesses. 
93 See, for example, W Healthcare NHS Trust v H [2005] 1 WLR 834 where a woman had previously 
said that she did not want to be kept alive by machines.  This advance directive was held not to be 
sufficiently clear to constitute a directive that a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy tube not be 
reinserted after it had been dislodged. 
94 See, for example, Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649 where a refusal to 
receive blood products was held not to be a valid refusal as the maker of the statement wrongly 
assumed that other products would have been a sufficient substitute. 
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directive but has not yet done so, or has changed his or her mind about the directive, a 
medical professional would not be required to follow it.95 Secondly, a number of 
statutes clearly contemplate that an advance directive refusing treatment may not 
operate if the circumstances have changed for the maker of the directive since the 
directive was completed.96  Thirdly, although only in Queensland, a medical 
professional is excused from following a directive that is uncertain.97   
 
While the statutory provisions that excuse medical professionals from following an 
advance directive are divergent, they all have one uniting feature.  The circumstances 
contemplated would also allow a medical professional not to follow an advance 
directive at common law.  All of the statutory provisions satisfy the common law test 
– the maker of the directive would not have intended it to operate in the circumstances 
that have arisen. 
 
Even those who strongly support the right of an individual to have his or her advance 
directive followed would agree that an advance directive should not be followed in 
the circumstances described above.  Indeed, it would be inconsistent with principles 
of autonomy for a medical professional to follow an advance directive that no longer 
represented the person’s wishes.  If an advance directive was followed in such a case, 
the principle of autonomy would be eroded, not promoted.  An individual’s autonomy 
will only be advanced if the advance directive represented his or her treatment choice.  
The common law position is consistent with the principle of autonomy.  To the extent 
                                                 
95 Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) s 7(3); Guardianship and 
Administration Act 1990 (WA) s 110S(6); Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 7(1); Medical 
Treatment (Health Directions) Act 2006 (ACT) ss 10(1) and 12; Natural Death Act 1989 (NT) s 
4(3)(a). 
96 In South Australia, an advance directive refusing treatment will only operate if a person is in the 
terminal phase of a terminal illness or in a persistent vegetative state.  Therefore, if a person is no 
longer in such a condition, the legislation will not apply: Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative 
Care Act 1995 (SA) s 7(3).  In Western Australia, an advance directive will not apply if there has been 
a change of circumstances not anticipated by the maker of the directive, and the change of 
circumstances would have caused a reasonable person to have changed his or her mind: Guardianship 
and Administration Act 1990 (WA) s 110S(3). In Victoria, a refusal of treatment certificate will cease 
to apply if the individual recovers from the condition to which the certificate applies: Medical 
Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) s 7(3). In the Northern Territory, an advance directive will only apply if a 
person is suffering from a terminal illness.  Therefore, if the person no longer suffers from that 
condition, a medical professional will not be able to follow the advance directive: Natural Death Act 
1989 (NT) s 4(3). In Queensland, a medical professional is excused from following an advance 
directive if he or she has reasonable grounds to believe that circumstances have changed to the extent 
that the terms of the directive are inappropriate: Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 103. 
97 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 103. 
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that the statutory provisions referred to above would have the same outcome at 
common law, they can be justified as achieving goal 1, as outlined in section 3 above. 
 
There is a further excuse that exists in Queensland, however, that cannot be justified 
on the grounds of autonomy.  A medical professional is excused from following a 
directive if he or she has reasonable grounds to believe that a directive is inconsistent 
with good medical practice.98  This provision allows a medical professional to 
disregard an advance directive refusing treatment if, according to good medical 
practice, treatment is clinically indicated.  The effect of this provision is that the 
autonomous choice of a competent adult can be overridden on medical grounds, at the 
discretion of the medical professional.99   
 
The original Bill did not contain an excuse relating to ‘good medical practice’.  This 
amendment was introduced by an independent Member of Parliament, Mrs EA 
Cunningham.  When moving the amendment, she made the following comments: 
 
 This amendment strengthens the argument about the role of the [advance health 
directive] and where the medical profession has the right to overrule or not comply 
with the advance health directive. All of the assurances have been given in meetings 
with the Minister that one overriding factor would continue, and that is the obligation 
on doctors to act honourably and in accordance with good medical practice.   These 
words reinforce that obligation, that responsibility.100 
 
This extract demonstrates the intention of the amendment.  An individual’s autonomy 
is overridden if that person’s choice is contrary to what is regarded by medical 
professionals as good medical practice.101  This position is in sharp contrast with the 
right of an individual at common law to refuse treatment as described earlier in the 
article.  It is the very heart of the principle of autonomy that a competent adult may 
make a treatment decision even if others, including medical professionals, disagree 
with that decision.  A decision refusing treatment must be respected even if the reason 
                                                 
98 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 103(1). 
99 Oddly, the medical professional is specifically excused from legal liability if he or she chooses to 
follow (s 101) or chooses not to follow (s 103(2)) the directive.   
100 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 12 May 1998, 1025 (Liz Cunningham). 
101 It should be noted, however, that this provision may also be relevant if a person is insisting on 
treatment that a medical professional regards as futile.  This alternative purpose was referred to by the 
then Attorney-General, Denver Beanland, following the introduction of the amendment by Liz 
Cunningham: Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 12 May 1998, 1025 (Denver 
Beanland).   
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for the refusal of treatment is ‘rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent’.102  
As such, the Queensland provision is at odds with the principles of autonomy and 
cannot be justified.  It does not purport to embody a common law exception (goal 1) 
or remove a legitimate barrier (goal 2) that discourages a medical professional from 
following it. 
 
 
11. Conclusions 
 
Statutory advance directive regimes now operate in six of Australia’s eight 
jurisdictions.  The major driving factor behind the enactment of legislation was the 
uncertainty that existed about whether the common law applied in Australia.  The 
central objective of parliaments in enacting legislation, then, was to enshrine existing 
common law principles.  Given that the common law was shaped by the principle of 
autonomy, and it has been expressly noted that this principle overrides that of sanctity 
of life in the context of refusal of life-sustaining treatment, it should follow that the 
legislation also safeguards and promotes the autonomy of competent individuals to 
refuse such treatment.  However, as revealed in this article, this has not occurred.  The 
statutes in most jurisdictions contain restrictions that cannot be justified either as 
necessary to enshrine common law principles, or to overcome practical barriers that 
prevented advance directives from being followed at common law. 
 
It is likely that regulation of advance directives will continue to remain on the 
political agenda for some time.  An Advance Care Directives Working Group has 
been established by the Clinical, Technical and Ethical Principal Committee of the 
Australian Health Ministers’ Advisory Council.  The goal of this working group is to 
move towards greater national consistency.103  Clearly, a move towards consistency of 
regulation of advance directives would be desirable.   
 
It is to be hoped that the promotion of autonomy should also be a goal when 
contemplating legislative reform.  If reform is contemplated, careful consideration 
                                                 
102 Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649, 664. 
103 See also the recent report issued by the National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission, ‘A 
Healthier Future for All Australians – Final Report’, June 2009.  While not focusing specifically on 
advance directives, recommendation 57 in the report was that advance care planning be funded and 
implemented nationally. 
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should be given to existing legislative models, the restrictions that they impose, and 
the effect of those restrictions on the ability of individuals to make an advance refusal 
of life-sustaining treatment.  If future legislators are truly seeking to promote the 
principle of autonomy, the Western Australian model should be the starting point.  
The Western Australian legislation regulates capacity, form and witnessing.  
However, it does not contain restrictions about when an individual can complete a 
directive, when it will operate, or provisions, over and above those that exist at 
common law, that excuse a medical professional for not following the directive.  This 
model also encourages an individual to obtain information before completing a 
directive, but the advance directive is not invalid if the person chooses not to obtain 
such information. 
 
A competent adult’s advance refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment is an 
entrenched common law right.  It constitutes an exercise of that individual’s 
autonomy, and has been upheld on that basis by the courts.  Legislative enshrinement 
of such a right should not derogate from that right.  Yet this is currently the position in 
most statutory jurisdictions.  Legislation in this area should seek to replicate or 
improve on the common law by enshrining the right to refuse life-sustaining medical 
treatment and, where possible, removing practical barriers that may have hindered the 
following of an advance directive at common law.  Legislative provisions that seek to 
restrict the scope of the operation of an advance directive in other ways cannot be 
justified as they erode, rather than promote the principle of autonomy. 
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South Australia 
 
Consent to Medical 
Treatment and 
Palliative Care Act 
1995 
 
 
Western Australia 
 
Guardianship and 
Administration Act 
1990  
 
Victoria 
 
Medical Treatment 
Act 1988 
 
Australian Capital 
Territory 
Medical Treatment 
(Health Directions) 
Act 2006 
 
Northern Territory 
 
Natural Death Act 
1989 
 
Queensland 
 
Powers of Attorney 
Act 1998 
 
Capacity 
 
 
 
A person … may, 
while of sound mind, 
give a direction: s 
7(1) 
 
A person who … has 
full legal capacity 
may make an advance 
health directive: s 
110P 
 
 
If … are satisfied that 
the patient is of sound 
mind … the registered 
practitioner and the 
other person may … 
witness a … 
certificate: s 5(1)(d) 
 
 
… a health direction 
cannot be made by a 
person for whom a 
guardian is appointed 
… or anyone else who 
has impaired 
decision-making 
capacity: s 7(3) 
 
 
A person of sound 
mind … may make a 
direction: s 4(1) 
 
A principal may make 
an advance directive 
… only if the 
principal understands 
the … matters [listed]: 
s 42(1) 
 
‘Capacity’ … means 
the person is capable 
of understanding the 
nature and effect of 
decisions …; and 
freely and voluntarily 
making decisions …; 
and communicating 
the decisions: sch 3 
 
 
Absence of vitiating 
factors 
 
 
--- 
 
A treatment decision 
… is invalid if  … is 
not made voluntarily: 
s 110R 
 
 
If … are satisfied that 
the patient’s decision 
is made voluntarily 
and without 
inducement or 
compulsion … the 
registered practitioner 
and the other person 
 
A person must not 
dishonestly induce 
someone else to make 
… a health direction: 
s 20 
 
--- 
 
[See definition of 
‘capacity’ above.] 
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may … witness a … 
certificate: s 5(1)(b) 
 
 
 
Form 
 
 
A direction must be in 
the form prescribed 
by regulation: s 7(2) 
 
 
An advance directive 
is not valid unless it is 
in the form or 
substantially in the 
form prescribed by 
the regulations: s 
110Q(1)(a) 
 
 
A refusal of treatment 
certificate must be in 
the form of Sch 1: s 
5(2) 
 
If the Minister 
approves a form for a 
particular purpose, the 
approved form must 
be used for that 
purpose: s 21(2)  
 
[See approved form 
2007 No 55.] 
  
 
A person … may 
make a direction in 
the prescribed form: s 
4(1) 
 
An advance health 
directive must be 
written and may be in 
the approved form: s 
44(2) 
 
Signature and date 
 
 
[The form appearing 
in the Regulations 
contains provision for 
signature and date.] 
 
 
An advance directive 
is not valid unless it is 
signed by its maker: s 
110Q 
 
[The legislation does 
not contain a 
requirement about 
date and, at the time 
of writing, regulations 
have not been 
promulgated.] 
 
 
[The form contains 
provision for signing 
and dating by the 
maker.] 
 
A written health 
directive is not valid 
unless it is signed by 
the maker of the 
direction: s 8 
 
[Approved form 2007 
No 55 contains 
provision for dating 
by the maker.] 
 
 
 [The prescribed form 
contains provision for 
signing and dating by 
the maker.] 
 
An enduring 
document must be 
signed by the 
principal: s 44(3) 
 
[The prescribed form 
has provision for the 
witness, not the 
principal, to insert a 
date.] 
 
Witnessing 
 
 
[The form appearing 
in the Regulations 
contains provision for 
a witness attesting to 
the fact that the 
 
An advance directive 
is not valid unless the 
signature … is 
witnessed by 2 
persons … and it is 
 
If a registered medical 
practitioner and 
another person are 
each satisfied that the 
patient is of sound 
 
A written health 
direction is not valid 
unless the signature is 
witnessed by 2 other 
people; and each 
 
A direction … is of no 
effect unless 
witnessed by 2 
witnesses: s 4(2) 
 
An enduring 
document must be 
signed and dated by 
an eligible witness: s 
44(3) 
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document was signed 
in the presence of the 
witness and that the 
signer appeared to 
understand the nature 
and effect of the 
direction.] 
signed by the 
witnesses in the 
presence of its maker 
and … each other: s 
110Q(1)(d) and (e) 
mind … the registered 
medical practitioner 
and other person may 
together witness a 
refusal of treatment 
certificate: s 5 (1) 
 
witness signs the 
direction in the 
presence of the other 
witness and the 
person making the 
direction: s 8 
 
... an enduring 
document … must 
include a certificate 
signed by the witness 
stating the principal 
signed … in the 
witness’s presence; 
and at the time, 
appeared to the 
witness to have the 
capacity necessary to 
make the enduring 
document: s 44(4) 
 
An advance directive 
must also include a 
certificate … by a 
doctor stating the 
principal, at the time 
of making the 
advance directive, 
appeared to the doctor 
to have the capacity 
necessary to make it: 
s 44(6) 
 
 
Requirement to 
provide information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
--- 
 
An advance directive 
is not valid unless the 
maker is encouraged 
to seek legal or 
medical advice: s 
110Q(1)(a) 
 
Despite subsection 
 
If … are satisfied that 
the patient has been 
informed about the 
nature of his or her 
condition to an extent 
which is reasonably 
sufficient to enable 
the patient to make a 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
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(1)(b), the validity of 
an advance heath 
directive is not 
affected by a failure 
to comply with 
subsection (1)(b): s 
110Q(2) 
decision about 
whether or not to 
refuse medical 
treatment generally or 
of a particular kind … 
for that condition and 
that the patient has 
appeared to 
understand that 
information … the 
registered practitioner 
and the other person 
may … witness a … 
certificate: s 5(1)(c) 
 
 
 
Circumstances in 
which an advance 
directive can be 
completed 
 
 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
If … are satisfied that 
a patient has clearly 
expressed or indicated 
a decision … for a 
current condition … 
the registered 
practitioner and the 
other person may … 
witness a … 
certificate: s 5(1)(a) 
 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Circumstances in 
which an advance 
directive can operate 
 
 
 
 
A person … may … 
give a direction … 
about the medical 
treatment that the 
person wants … if he 
or she is at some 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
A person …who 
desires not to be 
subjected to 
extraordinary 
measures in the event 
of his or her suffering 
 
A direction to 
withhold or withdraw 
a life-sustaining 
measure can not 
operate unless the 
principal has a 
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future time in the 
terminal phase of a 
terminal illness, or in 
a persistent vegetative 
state: s 7(1)(a) 
 
from a terminal 
illness, may make a 
direction: s 4(1) 
terminal illness or 
condition that is 
incurable or 
irreversible and …the 
person may 
reasonably be 
expected to die within 
1 year; or the person 
is in a persistent 
vegetative state … ; 
or the person is 
permanently 
unconscious … ; or 
the person has an 
illness or injury of 
such severity that 
there is no reasonable 
prospect that the 
person will recover to 
the extent that the 
person’s life can be 
sustained without the 
continued application 
of life-sustaining 
measures: s 36(2)(a)   
 
A direction to 
withhold or withdraw 
a life-sustaining 
measure can not 
operate unless … for 
a direction to 
withhold or withdraw 
artificial nutrition or 
artificial hydration - 
the commencement or 
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continuation of the 
measure would be 
inconsistent with 
good medical 
practice: s 36(2)(b) 
 
A direction to 
withhold or withdraw 
a life-sustaining 
measure can not 
operate unless the 
person has no 
reasonable prospect of 
regaining capacity: s 
36(2)(c) 
 
Circumstances in 
which an advance 
directive can be 
ignored 
 
 
 
If there is no reason to 
suppose that the 
person has revoked, 
or intended to revoke, 
the direction, the 
person is to be taken 
to have … refused 
medical treatment: s 
7(3) 
 
[The direction will 
only operate if a 
person is in the 
terminal phase of a 
terminal illness: see 
above.  If the 
condition changes, the 
direction will not 
operate.] 
 
 
… a treatment 
decision in an 
advance health 
directive is taken to 
have been revoked if 
the maker of the 
directive has changed 
his or her mind about 
the treatment decision 
since making the 
directive: s 110S(6) 
 
… a treatment 
decision in an 
advance health 
directive does not 
operate if 
circumstances exist or 
have arisen that the 
maker of the directive 
 
A refusal of treatment 
certificate may be 
cancelled by the 
person who gave the 
certificate … clearly 
expressing or 
indicating to a 
registered medical 
practitioner or another 
person a decision to 
cancel the certificate: 
s 7(1) 
 
A refusal of treatment 
certificate ceases to 
apply to a person if 
the medical condition 
of the person has 
changed to such an 
extent that the 
 
A health direction … 
may be revoked by 
the person … clearly 
expressing to a health 
professional or 
someone else a 
decision to revoke the 
direction: s 10(1) 
 
… where a person … 
has made a direction 
… it shall be the duty 
of that medical 
practitioner to act in 
accordance with the 
direction unless there 
is reasonable ground 
to believe that the 
person has revoked, 
or intended to revoke, 
the direction: s 4(3)(a) 
 
This section applies if 
a health provider has 
reasonable grounds to 
believe that a 
direction in an 
advance health 
directive is uncertain 
or inconsistent with 
good medical practice 
or that circumstances, 
including advances in 
medical science, have 
changed to the extent 
that the terms of the 
direction are 
inappropriate: s 
103(1) 
 
The health provider 
does not incur any 
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would not have 
reasonably anticipate 
at the time of making 
the directive; and 
would have caused a 
reasonable person in 
the maker’s position 
to have changed his or 
her mind about the 
treatment decision: s 
110S(3) 
condition in relation 
to which the 
certificate was given 
is no longer current: s 
7(3) 
 
liability, either to the 
adult or anyone else, 
if the health provider 
does not act in 
accordance with the 
direction: s 103(2) 
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